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TELETEXT-SEARCHING FOR THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: TELECOMMUNICATIONS
RESEARCH AND ACTION CENTER v. FCC
The first amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees freedom of speech and freedom of the press." In applying
the first amendment, the Supreme Court has distinguished broad-
cast from print media, allowing content regulation of television and
radio broadcasts2 while prohibiting such regulation of the print
I See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides in part: "Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ... ." Id. It was the belief
of the founding fathers "that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth ... and that this should
be a fundamental principle of the American government." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969). Thus, government intrusion upon free expression has always been assumed to be
forbidden by the first amendment. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966); Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931); see also Kalven, "Uninhibited, Robust and Wide-
Open"--A Note on Free Speech and the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REv. 289, 297-99 (1968)
(discussing invalidation of various state statutes for infringement of first amendment
rights).
The framers of the Constitution believed that in order to keep society free, the citizenry
and the press must have freedom to criticize the government and its officials. E. HunON,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN AMERICA 6-7 (1963). Thus, legislative or judicial restric-
tions of political discourse have been held to be at odds with the guarantees of the first
amendment. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (state law prohibiting
election day editorials invalid); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964)
(state defamation damages for public official invalid without showing actual malice). The
first amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a
multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and
always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all." New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at
270 (quoting Justice Hand's opinion in United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362,
372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)). This principle of the first amendment seeks to promote robust, wide-
open debate, and a marketplace of ideas from which it is hoped that truth will emerge to an
informed electorate. See id.
There is dispute, however, whether the first amendment is an affirmative sword permit-
ting state mandated access (content regulation) or a shield against governmental interfer-
ence. Compare Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L.
REV. 1641 passim (1967) (suggesting first amendment requires public access to press) with
Baldasty & Simpson, The Deceptive "Right to Know": How Pessimism Rewrote the First
Amendment, 56 WASH. L. REv. 365 passim (1981) (first amendment commands no govern-
ment interference).
2 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Red Lion is the leading
case upholding the lesser first amendment protection of the broadcast media. In Red Lion,
the Court upheld an FCC right of reply rule to a "personal attack" which took place on a
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media.3 This distinction is based on the notion that the limited
availability of broadcast frequencies causes the broadcast media to
enjoy a monopoly that the print media do not, thus necessitating
government regulation to ensure that the broadcast media serve
the public interest.4 Advancements in information technology,
radio program. See id. at 379. The Court justified limiting first amendment rights of broad-
casting because of the scarcity of radio frequencies. Id. at 379. The Red Lion Court asserted
that, because "there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there
are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write or publish." Id. at 388;
see also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 374 (1984) (different first amend-
ment standard applies to broadcast regulation); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (licensee must grant reasonable access to public).
At one time, radio and television news were not considered a source of serious journal-
ism, and were not granted full first amendment protection. See Bollinger, Freedom of The
Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75
MicH. L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1976); see also Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications
Press, 1975 DuKE L.J. 213, 219-20 (1975) (lack of journalistic effort at inception of radio and
television partially explains different first amendment treatment). However, because of the
growth in size and quality of broadcast journalism the feeling arose that, "[wihile it may
have been once true that TV was not the source of high quality.., programming deserving
of full First Amendment protection," it is deserving of such protection today. Id. at 220.
1 See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). In Tornillo, the
Supreme Court overruled a Florida "right to reply" statute which granted political candi-
dates newspaper space equal to the space used by the newspapers in criticizing the candi-
date or attacking his record. See id. at 256-58. The Court held that the statute intruded on
editorial function and infringed on freedom of the press under the first amendment. See id.
The Court stated that "[it has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this
crucial [editorial] process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a
free press." Id. at 258.
The traditional basis for print media protection was noted by Justice White in Tornillo,
when he stated: "[W]e have never thought that the First Amendment permitted public offi-
cials to dictate to the press the contents of its news columns or the slant of its editorials."
Id. at 261 (White, J., concurring). However, the Tornillo Court does not mention Red Lion
or any possible conflict between the two. See generally Note, Reconciling Red Lion and
Tornillo: A Consistent Theory of Media Regulation, 26 STAN. L. REV. 536 (1976) (constitu-
tional rationale for broadcast regulation is based on inadequate distinction between print
and broadcast media).
See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984) (given spectrum
scarcity, licensees must serve as fiduciaries for the public). "A broadcaster seeks and is
granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when
he accepts that'franchise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations." Office of Com-
munications of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Bur-
ger, J.).
Due to the unique nature of electronic media, Congress established the Federal Radio
Commission in 1927 to allocate radio frequencies because not all who wished to speak could
do so because of the scarcity of channels. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 376 n.5. Congress chose
to give exclusive, short term licenses on the condition that the licensee served the "public
convenience, interest, and necessity." See Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, ch. 169, 44
Stat. 1162, 1163 (1927) (repealed 1934); Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301,
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however, have blurred the distinctions between broadcast and
print media, raising the issue of whether content regulation may be
constitutionally applied to newly developed forms of electronic me-
dia under the Supreme Court's spectrum scarcity distinction.5 Re-
cently, in Telecommunications Research and Action Center v.
FCC ("TRAC"), the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit questioned, without deciding, the continued via-
bility of the Supreme Court's scarcity distinction, 7 and held that
the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") had acted rea-
sonably in not applying certain content regulations to the teletext
information system.8
In TRAC, the respondent FCC issued a report and order
("Teletext Order"), concluding that the authorization of teletext
transmission by television broadcast stations would serve the pub-
lic interest.9 The Teletext Order also determined that certain con-
309(a) (1982). In 1943, the Supreme Court agreed that the physical scarcity of airwaves
justified broadcast regulation. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
216 (1943). In National Broadcasting, the Court noted that "[u]nlike other modes of ex-
pression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is
why ... it is subject to governmental regulation." Id. at 226.
5 See NEUSTADT, THE BIRTH OF ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING 28-31 (1982); see also Lively,
Fear and the Media: A First Amendment Horror Show, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1071, 1074-91
(1985) (uncertainty about new technology has given rise to regulation which limits first
amendment rights of such media).
Advances in technology have allowed for more efficient use of the radio spectrum, mak-
ing scarcity a debatable issue. Compare Bazelon, supra note 2, at 233 (development of UHF
and more efficient VHF promises end to scarcity) with Freedom of Expression and the
Electronic Media: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Trans-
portation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1982) (statement of William Van Alstyne) ("Scarcity
may exist despite the existence of many channels.").
0 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
7 See id. at 506-09.
' See id. at 513, 518. Teletext systems allow viewers whose sets are equipped with a
special decoder to receive broadcasts of printed news reports, stock quotations, classified
ads, restaurant menus, and movie guides. Carlson, New Age Front Page, 3 CAL. LAW. at 14
(June 1983). Digital data are inserted in a few lines of the television picture called the "ver-
tical blanking interval" ("VBI"). Arlon, "Teletext Takes to the Air" [1984 Field Guide],
CHANNELS at 41. The VBI is the black bar that appears between pictures when the picture is
rolled vertically. It has twenty-one of the 525 lines that make up the television signal. It has
been estimated that by dedicating two lines of the VBI to teletext, 100 pages of text plus
simple graphics could be cycled every twenty-five seconds. This limits most broadcast
teletext systems to about 150 pages or screens of text. See generally Neustadt, Skall &
Hammer, The Regulation of Electronic Publishing, 33 FED. Comm. L.J. 331, 332-41 (1981)
(survey of teletext systems). Although not at issue in TRAC, teletext may also be transmit-
ted by way of cable or telephone. See id.
9 See Report and Order, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1309, 1320 (1983). The FCC had
previously released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to explore possible authorization for
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tent regulation provisions of the Communications Act of 1934
("the Act"),'0 including the reasonable access rule," the equal op-
portunity rule,' and the fairness doctrine, 3 would not be applica-
television stations to operate teletext systems. See 46 Fed. Reg. 60,851 (1981) (to be codified
at 47 C.F.R. § 73) (proposed Nov. 27, 1981). The FCC announced its goal as seeking "to
provide a regulatory environment that is conducive to the emergence and implementation of
new technology and new uses of the [broadcast spectrum]." Id. Additionally, the FCC con-
cluded that "[uln the case of teletext, the available evidence appears to indicate that the
forces of competition and the open market are well suited to obtaining the kinds and
amounts of service that are most desirable in terms of the public interest." Id. at 60,852.
The Notice, therefore, proposed that "teletext ... be treated as an anciallary [sic] service"
and that "[s]tations ... not be required to observe service guidelines or other performance
standards." Id. at 60,853.
10 Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-800 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). In passing the Communications Act, Con-
gress centralized the regulation of the telephone, telegraph, and broadcasting industries. See
47 U.S.C. at § 152 (1982). The purpose of the Communications Act of 1934 is to make
available "a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges." Id. at § 151. The Act provides the
FCC with a broad mandate of power, including the power to determine who may speak. See
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-17 (1943).
11 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982). Section 312(a)(7) provides in part- "The Commission
may revoke station license or construction permit for willful or repeated failure to allow
reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a
broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of
his candidacy." Id.
The Supreme Court has construed section 312(a)(7) as creating an affirmative right of
reasonable access to broadcast facilities for federal candidates. See Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 386 (1981).
12 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982). Section 315(a) provides in part: "If any licensee shall permit
any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting
station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the
use of such broadcasting station .... "Id.
Section 315(b) imposes the so-called "lowest unit rate" obligation upon licensees. This
provision provides that:
The charges made for the use of any broadcasting station by any person who
is a legally qualified candidate for any public office in connection with his cam-
paigu for nomination for election, or election to such office shall not exceed-
(1) during the forty-five days preceding the date of a primary or primary run-
off election and during the sixty days preceding the date of a general or special
election in which such person is a candidate, the lowest unit charge of the station
for the same class and amount of time for the same period; and
(2) at any other time, the charges made for comparable use of such station by
other users thereof.
47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1982).
-- 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1986). The fairness doctrine "provides that broadcasters have
certain obligations to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on
issues of public importance." Id. The doctrine arose "under the Commission's power to issue
regulations consistent with the 'public interest'. .. [and] imposes two affirmative obligations
on the broadcaster: the coverage of issues of public importance must be adequate and such
coverage must fairly -reflect differing viewpoints." Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Dem-
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ble to teletext. 4 The petitioners, Telecommunications Research
and Action Center and Media Access Project, each filed motions
for reconsideration of the FCC decision, contending that teletext
services are broadcasting as defined under the Act, and are, there-
fore, subject to the content regulations of the Act."5 The FCC, in
rejecting these motions, asserted that teletext must be considered a
"print medium" for first amendment purposes, and is thereby enti-
tled to full freedom of press protection." On appeal, the Circuit
ocratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110-11 (1973). Additionally, the fairness doctrine includes
the personal attack rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920(a) (1986), and the political editorial rule, 47
C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1986), to ensure that public issues are given balanced treatment. See Swil-
linger, Candidates and the New Technologies: Should Political Broadcasting Rules Apply?,
49 Mo. L. REV. 85 (1984); but see R. LAnUNSKI, THE FIRST AMENDMENT UNDER SEIGE 20
(1981) (broadcasters have complained that these rules are costly and violate first amend-
ment rights); see also Bollier, The Strange Politics of 'Fairness', CHANNELS, at 46-52 (Jan.-
Feb. 1986) (sensing time is right for broadcasters to be mounting constitutional challenge to
fairness doctrine).
The Supreme Court has recently sent signals that it would reconsider the constitution-
ality of the fairness doctrine if the FCC could show that it limits rather than enhances free
speech. See Weinberg, Are the FCC and the Supreme Court Changing Signals on the Fair-
ness Doctrine, 3 Comm. LAW. at 7 (Summer 1985) (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364, 379 n.12 (1984)). Notwithstanding the constitutional question, the D.C. Circuit
has recently said that the FCC has the power to repeal the doctrine on public interest
grounds. See Appeals Court to FCC on Fairness Doctrine: If You Don't Like It, Don't
Enforce It, BROADCASTING at 58 (Oct. 6, 1986).
1 See Report and Order, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1309, 1322 (1983). Relying on Com-
mission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act of 1934, 68
F.C.C.2d 1079, 1083 (1978), the FCC suggested that, by providing a candidate access to the
broad television audience attracted to the station's regular broadcast operation, a licensee
satisfied its section 312(a)(7) duties even if the broadcaster contemporaneously denied ac-
cess to the more limited audience viewing the "ancillary or subsidiary" teletext service. See
53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 1322-23.
The Commission found the equal opportunity rule of section 315 wholly inapposite to
teletext. Noting that a broadcast "use" triggered section 315's substantive obligations, that a
"use" required "a personal appearance by a legally qualified candidate by voice or picture,"
and that the textual and graphics nature of teletext made it "inherently not a medium by
which a candidate [could] make a personal appearance," the Commission held that teletext
could not trigger the requirements of section 315. See 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 1323; see
also supra note 12 (statutory provisions of section 315).
15 TRAC, 801 F.2d at 505. Telecommunications Research and Action Center (formerly
the National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting) and Media Access Project, the petition-
ers, are two public interest groups who act as "watchdogs" of the FCC. See Schwartzman,
The Fairness Doctrine Inquiry-Let's Leave This Job to Congress, 3 Comm. LAW. at 3
(Summer 1985). The two groups had submitted comments in the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 46 Fed. Reg. 60,851 (1981), objecting to any change in the application of the
political broadcast rules. See Brief for Petitioners at 9.
" See TRAC, 801 F.2d at 505-06 (citing 101 F.C.C.2d at 833); see also 101 F.C.C. 2d at
834 & n.16. The Commission found that "neither the letter nor the purposes of the First
Amendment would be served by... a ruling... [requiring the FCC] to intrude into the
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the FCC's
decision with regard to the reasonable access rule and the fairness
doctrine, but reversed and remanded its decision with respect to
the equal opportunity rule.'"
Writing for the court, Circuit Judge Bork undertook an analy-
sis of the Supreme Court's spectrum scarcity doctrine,"8 and sug-
gested that "[e]mploying the scarcity concept as an analytic tool,
particularly with respect to new and unforeseen technologies, inev-
itably leads to strained reasoning and artificial results."' 9 The ma-
jority acknowledged the possibility that the Supreme Court would
one day reevaluate the doctrine, but stated that until it did,
neither the circuit court of appeals nor the FCC were empowered
"to seek new rationales to remedy the inadequacy of the doctrine
in this area."2 ° The court concluded, therefore, that it was bound
by precedent to apply the scarcity doctrine to teletext and thus
could not, on first amendment grounds, refuse to apply the content
regulations provided for in the Communications Act.21
editorial judgments of teletext writers." Id.
'7 See TRAC, 801 F.2d at 502-03.
18 See id. at 506-09. The court challenged the scarcity rationale stating, "[aill economic
goods are scarce, not least the newsprint, ink, delivery trucks... and other resources that go
into the production ... of print journalism.... Since scarcity is a universal fact, it can
hardly explain regulation in one context and not another." Id. at 508; see also Coase, The
Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1959) (price mechanism should
determine access to scarce resources).
One commentator has rejected the scarcity doctrine developed in Red Lion as "eco-
nomic nonsense." See R. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSI OF THE LAW 634 (1986). Posner notes
that while each frequency may be used by only one party within a particular area, different
frequencies constitute perfect substitutes for one another. See id. Some markets have a
dozen television stations, not including cable and satellite stations. Id. Posner notes that
invariably, the number of broadcast media stations exceeds the number of newspapers in a
given market. See id. But see Comment, A "Better" Marketplace Approach to Broadcast
Regulations, 36 FED. COMM. L.J. 27, 36 (1984) (marketplace approach does not take into
account certain societally desirable commodities).
It is submitted, however, that economic analysis fails to account for the fact that news-
print and other products that go into producing print media are economic goods available
on the free market, while the airwaves are subject to a licensing system. Government licens-
ing requirements contribute to the scarcity of the airwaves. It may be presumed, however,
that these licensing requirements are enforced with an eye towards the betterment of the
public interest, despite the resultant scarcity. See W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 76 (1984); but see Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Obser-
vations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67, 150-54 (1967)
(justifying regulation because of government licensing constitutes a circular argument).
'9 TRAC, 801 F.2d at 508.
20 Id. at 509.
21 See id.
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With its scope of review thus limited, the court confined its
analysis to whether the Communications Act permitted the FCC to
choose not to apply content regulations to teletext.22 The court
held that section 312(a)(7) of the Act,23 allowing candidates for
federal elective office reasonable access to broadcasting stations,
did not prohibit the FCC from adopting rules of reasonableness
which would exempt minor portions of a station's operations from
the requirements of the section. 2 The court similarly held that the
FCC was not bound to apply the fairness doctrine to teletext, rul-
ing that the doctrine is not a "binding statutory obligation" on the
FCC, but a policy created by the FCC and subject to application
pursuant to its discretion.25 The court disagreed, however, with the
FCC determination that section 315 of the Act,2" which provides
for equal broadcast opportunity for all political candidates, did not
require application to teletext, holding that the FCC's construction
of the statute was "plainly at odds with the language and intent of
the statute. 27
22 See id. at 509-19. The court noted that the FCC's "construction of the statute[s] is
entitled to judicial deference unless there are compelling reasons [to conclude] that it is
wrong." Id. at 514 (citing Columbia Broadcasting System v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 390 (1981)
and quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969)).
23 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982); see supra note 11.
24 See TRAC, 801 F.2d at 512. Petitioners contended that the reasonable access rule
prohibits "blanket bans on candidate advertising and require[s] broadcasters to accommo-
date the reasonable needs of candidates." Id. at 510 (quoting Brief for TRAC/MAP at 49).
However, the court concluded that the "Commission's policy of proscribing 'blanket rules'
... meant only that broadcasters could not adopt policies that would effectively nullify...
access to federal candidates." Id. at 511. This did not mean that the Commission could not
determine that excluding a minor portion of a stations operations (such as teletext) from the
reasonable access rule was appropriate. Id. at 511-12.
The court found that the propriety of the FCC's approach was also supported by the
Commission's treatment of subscription television ("STV") under section 312(a)(7) in its
1978 Policy Statement, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079, 1093. See TRAC, 801 F.2d at 512. "In that deci-
sion, the Commission accepted the argument that an STV station should not have to pro-
vide access for political broadcasting during prime time hours ..... Id. The exemption of
the subscription service was justified because of the limited nature of the transmission vehi-
cle and the limited nongeneral interest nature of the service to be provided. See 68 F.C.C.2d
at 1093-94. The FCC Teletext ruling relies on the limited nature of the transmission vehicle
alone as sufficient justification for its exemption. See Hammond, To Be or Not to Be: FCC
Regulation of Video Subscription Technologies, 35 CATH. U.L. REV. 737, 749-50 (1986).
25 See TRAC, 801 F.2d at 517-18; see also supra note 13.
28 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982); see supra note 12.
27 See TRAC, 801 F.2d at 515. The court stated: "We believe that the agency erred in
concluding that teletext does not constitute 'traditional broadcast services' within the con-
templation of the statute and that teletext is incapable of a 'use' as that statutory term has
evolved." Id. at 514; see also supra note 12 (text of section 315 of the Act).
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In a separate opinion, Judge MacKinnon agreed with the ma-
jority that the court was bound to apply the scarcity doctrine, and
that the equal opportunity rule was necessarily applicable to
teletext.28 Judge MacKinnon disagreed, however, with the court's
holding that the FCC, in its discretion, may choose not to apply
the reasonable access rule and the fairness doctrine to teletext.29
The TRAC court, deciding that it was bound by constitutional
precedent, nevertheless applied content regulation to teletext only
in the context of the equal opportunity rule.30 It is suggested that
the court's dissatisfaction with the scarcity doctrine led it to decide
the TRAC case on questionable statutory grounds. This Comment
will examine the differing first amendment treatment of the broad-
cast and print media with a view toward application to teletext. In
addition, it will be asserted that despite the fact that the TRAC
court did not consider distinguishing teletext from traditional
broadcast media for first amendment purposes, it achieved virtu-
ally the same result by misapplying content regulation to teletext.
Finally, a constitutional approach for teletext will be suggested
which is designed to promote first amendment goals while accom-
modating the statutory obligations of the Communications Act.
FIRST AMENDMENT DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN BROADCAST AND
PRINT MEDIA
While the Supreme Court permits reasonable content regula-
tion of broadcast media, it allows print publishers to be virtually
unencumbered by such regulation."' The fundamental rationale for
this distinction was enunciated in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC,32 where the Supreme Court determined that "[b]ecause of
the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to
put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be
28 See TRAC, 801 F.2d at 519 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
" See id. at 519.
30 See id. at 516.
s Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (content regulation
of broadcast media permitted) with Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) (content regulation of newspaper proscribed); see supra notes 2 and 3. The various
broadcast media have been examined to determine the first amendment protection appro-
priate to each. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting System v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (televi-
sion); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943) (radio); Midwest
Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), afl'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (cable
television).
32 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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expressed on this unique medium.""3 Thus, broadcasters may be
subject to content regulation based on the principle that the first
amendment permits the grant of an exclusive use of broadcast air-
waves, a limited resource, conditioned on the fulfillment of certain
public policy objectives.3 4 In contrast, the Court in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo3 5 struck down content regulation when
applied to print media as violative of the first amendment. 6 The
Court noted that, "[i]t has yet to be demonstrated how govern-
mental regulation of this crucial [editorial] process can be exer-
cised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free
press. '37
The Red Lion Court reconciled its holding with first amend-
ment guarantees by asserting that regulation of the broadcast me-
dia is necessary to achieve the public dissemination of a diversity
of ideas.38 Commentators, however, have discredited this rationale,
countering that the first amendment rejects content regulation as a
means of achieving diversity, and instead advocate reliance on the
11 Id. at 390; see W. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 18, at 80. The division of the airwaves so
that they may be used intelligibly constitutes necessary government regulation but such
regulation is neither expedient nor appropriate to protect the intelligibility of speech in
newspapers. Id. But see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1222, at 697 (1978)
(describing dangers of government control of media).
Professor Tribe has suggested that problems arise when government is given the power
to assure media access. Id. First, there is a danger of deterring those items of coverage that
-will require the media to afford access at its own expense. Id. Second, there is the danger of
government bureaucrats exercising pressure to manipulate the media into acquiesence. Id.
Finally, it is possible that access regulation could be increased into areas of more dubious
government control. Id.
3' See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389. "A newspaper can be operated at the whim or caprice
of its owners; a broadcast station cannot. After nearly five decades of operation the broad-
cast industry does not seem to have grasped the simple fact that a broadcast license is a
public trust subject to termination for breach of duty." Office of Communication of United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J.).
s 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
31 See id. at 256. The print media has been characterized as a "rich variety of outlets
for expression and persuasion, including journals, pamphlets, leaflets, and circular letters,
which are available to those without technical skills or deep pockets." Banzhaf v. FCC, 405
F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). Therefore, government
regulation relates only as to matters such as libel, slander, or obscenity and even then there
exists considerable first amendment freedom so as to ensure breathing space for uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open debate. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964).
3 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
" See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390; see, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S.
364, 375 (1984) (government has interest in preserving diversity of ideas through regulation
of broadcast media); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981)
(government must preserve marketplace of ideas).
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marketplace and structural regulation to ensure variety in the me-
dia.39 It is submitted that, while stating that it reluctantly followed
the scarcity doctrine, the TRAC court misconstrued the reasonable
access rule and fairness doctrine to reach the same result it would
have were it not limited by the Red Lion precedent.
TRAC COURT'S APPLICATION OF CONTENT REGULATION TO
TELETEXT
In TRAC, the court conceded the validity of the scarcity doc-
trine as applied to teletext, thus requiring it to apply certain con-
tent regulations provided for in the Communications Act.40 Not-
withstanding this concession, the court refused to apply the
reasonable access rule and the fairness doctrine to this new tech-
nology.41 It is submitted, however, that the court's subsequent
finding, that teletext is a "use" within the meaning of the Act for
the purpose of determining the applicability of the equal opportu-
nity rule, creates a substantial issue as to whether the reasonable
access rule should not be similarly applicable. When Congress
amended the Communications Act to require that broadcasting
stations give candidates for federal elective office reasonable access
to their stations, it also stipulated that the term "broadcasting sta-
tion" has the same meaning as in section 315 of the Act.42 This
cross reference would apparently make some form of the reasona-
39 See Bazelon, supra note 2, at 223-29; Mueller, Reforming Telecommunications Regu-
lation, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN CRISIS 57, 65-73. Mueller asserts that the primary factor
creating scarcity is not technology or the "finite" limits of the spectrum, but the govern-
ment's system of allocation. See Mueller, supra, at 68-69. Additionally, the absence of prop-
erty rights in spectrum space eliminates many of the incentives to either expand the chan-
nels or make more efficient use of the existing channels. See id. Mueller concludes that
there is no justification for distinguishing broadcast from print media based on a "scarcity"
rationale, especially now that newspapers are relying on telecommunications to an increas-
ing degree. See id. at 72.
40 See TRAC, 801 F.2d at 509. In construing the statutes, the court elected to follow the
judicial tradition of adopting a reading that would avoid rather than implicate constitu-
tional questions. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78 (1982); NLRB
v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 509 (1979). It is submitted, however, that tradi-
tion notwithstanding, this approach was inappropriate. Had the TRAC court decided the
constitutional issue, it would have avoided misconstruing the statutes while providing
teletext with the desired freedom necessary under the first amendment.
See supra notes 24 and 25.
42 See Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (adding 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7)). The provi-
sion was originally designated "§ 315(f)," but was recodified without change as "§ 315(c)."
Id.
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ble access rule applicable to teletext.43 It is submitted, therefore,
that the TRAC court's conclusory agreement with the FCC that
the exclusion of the reasonable access provision is "a rule of per se
reasonableness as to a minor portion of the station's operations" is
an inappropriate "blanket" exemption concerning an issue that
should instead be handled on a case by case basis by the FCC.
44
Turning to the fairness doctrine, the majority held that it is
not a "binding statutory obligation" under the Act; therefore, the
FCC is not precluded from altering the fairness obligation on
teletext services.45 Whether the fairness doctrine is a statutory ob-
ligation or a Commission policy centers around a 1959 amendment
to section 315 of the Act, which the majority construed as merely
ratifying the Commission's policy authorizing the fairness doc-
trine.48 The majority interpreted the language in section 315(a),
"under the Act," to mean that the fairness doctrine was promul-
13 Cf. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Di-
rect Broadcast Systems subject to political broadcast provisions). Noting that the FCC's
discretion is not boundless, the court stated that the Commission has no authority to experi-
ment with its statutory obligations. See id.
"1 It is submitted that the court erred in accepting the FCC's treatment of teletext as
an ancillary service because it will be carried with the broadcast signal as an offering to the
general public. Commission precedent has generally relied on "audience potential" to deter-
mine whether to exempt a particular service as ancillary. A service offered to the general
public, such as teletext, has the same audience potential as regular broadcast television. See
-Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 68 F.C.C.2d
1079, 1090-91 (1978); Swillinger, supra note 13, at 93. See generally Note, Teletext and the
FCC: Turning the Content Regulatory Clock Backwards, 64 B.U.L. REV. 1059 (1984) [here-
inafter Note, Teletext and the FCC] (FCC misconstrued content regulation); Note, The
Future of Teletext: Legal Implications of the FCC Deregulation of Electronic Publishing,
70 IOWA L. Rav. 709 (1985) (FCC acted beyond scope of authority in exempting teletext
from content regulation).
The TRAC court framed the scope of its review very narrowly, stating that "[tihe ques-
tion here is the rationality of the Commission's decision about the applicability of the [rea-
sonable access] provision to teletext." TRAC, 801 F.2d at 510. This was unlike their finding
that the agency's construction of the equal opportunity rule was "plainly at odds with the
language and intent of the statute," with the court concluding that the FCC's construction
violated the statute on its face. Id. at 515. Having cleared the statutory hurdle in the first
instance, reversal of the FCC decision could only take place if it was found to be arbitrary
and capricious. See National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1207. Thus, even if the
court disagrees with the agency's wisdom, it must uphold the decision if rational. Id. at
1197. Even so, one is reminded of the concurring opinion of Commissioner Jones in the
Teletext Order, "there is to my mind a basic inconsistency between the justifications given
for permitting broadcasting licensees to . . .provide teletext while at the same time ex-
empting teletext from broadcasting regulation. This sounds to me like having one's cake and
eating it too." 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 1333.
" See TRAC, 801 F.2d at 516-19.
16 See id. at 517.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
gated pursuant to authority conferred to the FCC.47 This interpre-
tation, it is submitted, contradicts the legislative history of section
315 and is irreconcilable with construction of that provision by the
Supreme Court.48
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH FOR TELETEXT
The failure of the TRAC court to treat teletext as a discrete,
unique medium forced the majority to confine itself to the broad-
cast regulatory model and, it is submitted, resulted in a decision
which suffers from strained reasoning and artificial results.49 The
court concluded that since teletext uses broadcast frequencies, the
scarcity doctrine must apply, ignoring the fact that cable and tele-
phone systems are alternative transmission methods available to
electronic publishing.8 0 Thus, it is suggested, that the limited
broadcast spectrum rationale of Red Lion, with its concern for di-
versity, is distinguishable when applied to teletext.51 Indeed, it is
submitted that regulating teletext when using broadcast frequen-
cies but not when transmitted by other methods will result in une-
qual application of the law.
Moreover, teletext, a system that delivers textual and graphic
information, is essentially a print medium, and regardless of the
particular mode of transmission, the text presented remains the
47 See id. at 518.
48 See Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 806 F.2d 1115, 1116 (Mikva, J., dissenting). Five of the nine judges
participating would have granted rehearing, but two of the circuit's eleven judges did not
vote, and the court rules require a majority (or six) of the active judges to grant rehearing.
See Fairness Doctrine Another Step Closer to Supreme Court, BROADCASTING, at 39 (Dec.
22, 1986). The deep split within the court was reflected in Judge Mikva's dissent, declaring
that the panel's conclusion was "flatly wrong" and asserting that Congress in 1959 clearly
intended to incorporate the fairness doctrine into the law. See id. In addition, for the past
several years Congress has adopted resolutions attached to appropriations legislation mak-
ing clear it opposes Commission action modifying the doctrine. See id.
11 Cf. Quincy Cable T.V., Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (cable tele-
vision warrants first amendment standard of review distinct from broadcasters). In Quincy
Cable, the court noted that, "once one has cleared the conceptual hurdle of recognizing that
all forms of television need not be treated as a generic unity for purposes of the First
Amendment, the analogy to more traditional media is compelling." Id. at 1450.
50 See NEUSTADT, supra note 5, at 10-14.
11 See, e.g., Watts, A Major Issue of the 1980's: New Communication Tools, in THE
FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED 181, 183 (1982) (existence of old and new media in tandem
will erode further any meaningful differences between them); see also Neustadt, Skall &
Hammer, supra note 8 at 345-58 (new electronic media pose fundamental questions for
communications policy).
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same.5 2 Thus, given the multiple transmission vehicles available for
teletext and its clear resemblance to print, it is submitted that the
Tornillo print model is the best suited means of teletext regula-
tion. It is not enough to say that teletext must be regulated be-
cause it uses broadcast frequencies. Rather, the proper analysis is
whether the restriction is narrowly tailored to further a substantial
government interest.5 3 In the case of the written word, like
teletext, the sound tradition is that diversity of expression is best
left to editorial discretion, rather than government regulators.54
It is submitted that regulation which is imposed solely because
of the transmission medium produces constitutionally suspect re-
sults. Content regulation may be appropriate for traditional broad-
casting, so long as spectrum scarcity exists, since such broadcasting
poses its own unique and special problems.5 5 However, as regards
electronic publishing, there are less chilling methods of regulation
available, which would structurally achieve diversity, while not im-
pinging on first amendment goals. 6
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of con-
tent regulation by walking a "tightrope" of interests, tipping the
balance in favor of those who seek access to the airwaves. In
TRAC, the court of appeals confined itself to the broadcast regula-
tory model, and thereby placed artificial constraints upon its rea-
soning, resulting in a decision of dubious merit. It is submitted
that the expanding field of electronic publishing forces a rethink-
ing of first amendment methodology and suggests that an environ-
'2See NEUSTADT, supra note 5, at 8-10.
53 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 369 (1984). Deciding whether a
restriction is narrowly tailored to further substantial government interests "requires a criti-
cal examination of the interests of the public and broadcasters in light of the particular
circumstances of each case." Id. at 381.
" See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); supra note 3.
5 See supra note 4. It is the purpose of the first amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas rather than to accept monopolization of that market, whether it be by
the government or by a private interest. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,
20 (1945). Network broadcasting, with its broad appeal and limited access, still appears to
fit the definition of scarcity, thus justifying content regulation. See Note, Teletext and the
FCC, supra note 44, at 1068 n.66 (more people want to broadcast than there are channels
available).
"1 See NEUSTArT, supra note 5, at 45-48.
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ment free from government regulation would be the more prudent
approach.
Thomas D. Logan
